In this major new work, Matthew Kramer seeks to establish two main conclusions. On the one hand, moral requirements are strongly objective. On the other hand, the objectivity of ethics is itself an ethical matter that rests primarily on ethical considerations. Moral realism - the doctrine that morality is indeed objective - is a moral doctrine.
Major new volume in our new series New Directions in Ethics
Takes on the big picture - defending the objectivity of ethics whilst rejecting the grounds of much of the existing debate between realists and anti-realists
Cuts across both ethical theory and metaethics
Distinguished by the quality of the scholarship and its ambitious range
About the Author
Matthew H. Kramer is Professor of Legal and Political Philosophy at the University of Cambridge; Fellow of Churchill College, Cambridge; and Director of the Cambridge Forum for Legal & Political Philosophy. His many previous books include The Quality of Freedom (2003); Where Law and Morality Meet (2004); and Objectivity and the Rule of Law (2007). He is also a co-editor of three books, most recently Freedom: A Philosophical Anthology (Blackwell, 2007); and The Legacy of H.L.A. Hart: Legal, Political, and Moral Philosophy (2008). His work covers many areas of moral, political, and legal philosophy.
Features
Major new volume in our new series New Directions in Ethics
Takes on the big picture - defending the objectivity of ethics whilst rejecting the grounds of much of the existing debate between realists and anti-realists
Cuts across both ethical theory and metaethics
Distinguished by the quality of the scholarship and its ambitious range
